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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

EXCLUSIVE AND NONEXCLUSIVE POWERS AND
THE ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT 1
John E. Howe*

OWERS of appointment may be classified as either general or
special. Under this classification a power is said to be a special
power when the donee has the right to exercise it only in favor of a
limited group of persons of which he himself is not a member.2
In considering special powers it is helpful to subdivide them into
two separate groups, one being termed exclusive and the other nonexclusive powers. In a factual situation where the intent of the donor
is such that the donee of the power has the right to exclude any of the
objects, it is said that the power through which he acts is an exclusive
one. Conversely, if it appears that a share should be given to each of the
objects, the donee does not have a right of exclusion, and the power is
said to be nonexclusive. 8
It should at once be apparent that all general powers are exclusive,
because the right of the donee to exclude an object in a general power
is never questioned, i.nasmuch as the donee could appoint the property
to himself_ and then give it to any object he so desired. It is also true
that in a majority of the cases in which there is a special power the question will not arise, because from the terms of the instrument it is clear
that the donor intended the donee to have this right of exclusion.
Therefore, any discussion of the subject is at once confined to a small
group of cases in which a special power is given to appoint to a limited
number, and it is impossible to tell from the instrument which creates
the power whether the donor intended all the objects to take a share,
or whether he intended only those selected by the donee to receive a
portion of the property.

P
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A.B., Western Kentucky State; LL.B., University of Kentucky; LL.M., University of Michigan. Member of the Kentucky State Bar.-Ed.
1
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§ 360 and 361 (1940); l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,§ 275 (1936); CHANCE, POWERS,§§ 1044-1203 (1841); FARWELL, POWERS,
3rd ed., 414-428 (1916); SUGDEN, POWERS, 8th. ed., 444-451 (1861).
2
I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 246 (1936). There are many other ways in
which powers may be classified. However, the method used will depend on the purpose
of the classification. For a general discussion of the various methods consult any of the
texts in note i, supra.
3
I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,§ 275 (1936); FARWELL, PoWERs, 3rd ed., 414
(1916); CHANCE, PowERs, § 1044 (1841).
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I
DETERMINING THE TYPE oF PowER

. In order to avoid any possible doubt as to the type of power that is
intended, the creating instrument should ~tate with certainty whether
the donee has the right to exclude any object, or whether the donor in..:
tends that all objects receive a share. Sugden says that when the donor
desires to create an exclusive power the instrument should contain the ·
following language: '"To all al}d every, or such one or more exclusively of the other or others' of the objects, as the donee shall appoint." 4 In giving the donee a power to appoint property in such a way
that all shall receive a share, the following form would be adequate to
accomplish the purpose: "To all and every of the objects as the donee
shall appoint, but no object shall be excluded by the donee."
However, if the donor desires all to share, it would undoubtedly
be better to make a direct gift of a part of the fund to the various obj ects, giving each one the minimum amount that the donor desires him
to have. After these gifts are provided for, the donor can then author-·
ize an exclusive appointment as to the remainder of the fund. 5
In the absence of express language as to the type of power created
by the donor; or where the language is ambiguous, it is said that the intent of the donor will govern.6 However, if the true intent were discoverable there could be little litigation as to the type of power created.
It is the failure of the donor to express his intent that creates the difficulty, and a statement to the effect that in any case where the ,wording
is ambiguous the intent of the donor will govern is of little practical
value in solving the problem.
It cannot be denied that the type of power .created is and should be
a product of the donor's intent. The real difficulty is in discovering that
intent, which in the final analysis rests on what the court itself believes
that intent to be. In reaching a conclusion as to the type of power
created one is actuall,y dealing with a case of judicial construction.7 In
fact, the court in construing the language of the donor seems to base its
conclusion on the wording which is used in the instrument. Hence,
where the type of power intended is not clear, the determination of this
question would seem to be governed solely by the language which is
utilized by the donor.
4

SucDEN, PoWERS, 8th_ed., 444 (1861).
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 360, comment d (1940).
8
FARWELL, PowERS, 3rd ed., 414 (1916).
7 Garthwaite v. Robinson, 2 Sim. 43 at 49, 57 Eng. Rep. 706 (1827); CHANCE,
POWERS,§ 1044 (1841). •
'
.
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The Restatement of the Law of Property provides:8 "The donee
of a special power may, by an otherwise effective appointment,
exclude one or more objects of the power from distribution of the property covered thereby, unless the donor manifests a contrary intent."
This section of the Restatement would seem to indicate a presumption
of exclusiveness. If. such is the case it should follow that where there
are two phrases of equal weight and one gives a power of selection but
the other indicates that all should share, the court as a matter of construction would uphold an appointment to a portion of the objects.
However in the only case the writer found in which there was a factual
situation similar to this, the court held that the donee did not have the
right to exclude any of the objects in exercising the power.9
It may be true that one would have to find an absolutely colorless
case, with no indication either way, before a definite conclusion could
be reached regarding the view advanced by the Restatement of Property. It is doubtful whether such a case will ever arise; and from the
information at hand one would be inclined to entertain some doubt concerning the presumption that a power is exclusive unless the intent of
the donor indicating otherwise is clearly expressed.
Therefore, in order to form a general rule for the construction of
powers which are created by ambiguous language, it is necessary that
the various forms which have been used be examined, and the decision
of the court in the particular case be noted. By the use of this method
it will be possible to determine the extent of any uniformity in the
decisions at the present time.
In the case of Hatchett 'V. Hatchett,1° the husband was given the
power to dispose of certain property by deed or will "among our children and grandchildren in such proportions as he may choose." The
court in construing the power held that all objects were entitled to a
share of the property. In another case the donor provided: "the said
property to be disposed of by her among my children as she may think
best." The donee gave each object a share of the property, but there
was fraud in the execution. The court, in its decision, intimated that
each object should be given a portion of the property.11 In an English
case, which involved similar language, certain property was bequeathed
"to ••. Martha Kemp for her life and then to be disposed of amongst
8

360 (1940).
Lippincott v. Ridgway, 10 N.J. Eq. 164 (1854).
10
' 103 Ala. 556 at 561, 16 So. 550 {1893).
11
Degman v. Degman, 98 Ky. 717 at 719, 34 S. W. $23 (1896).
9

PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§
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her children· as she shall think proper.m2 In passing on the validity
of the execution of this power the court held that each of the children
of Martha Kemp was entitled to share in the execution of the power.
The above cited cases are similar in that the word "among" is used
in each case. It is true that the word is somewhat qualified by the addition of "as she may think best" or "as she shall think proper," but,
nevertheless, the court in each case has held the power created thereby
to be nonexclusive. This attitude has been confirmed in other cases and
appears to be the unani'mous view.13
There are certain other phrases which i~:fluence the court i'n concluding that the power in question is nonexclusive. In Clay v. Smallwood 14 a will provided for certain gifts and then "the other to be distributed to my other children as she may direct." In the distribution
some of the children were omitted by the donee and the court held
that the exercise was void, inasmuch as each child was entitled to a share
of the property. The words used to create the power in the Clay case
were very similar to those used in one of the early cases involving this
phase of powers. In that case one third of the estate was devised to the
widow of the testator during her widowhood, but in event of her remarriage the testator provided: "I do will and desire her to give unto
my children the remainder of my estate, according as she shall think
fit." The court concluded that the power involved therein was a nonexclusive power.15 The controlling and similar words i.n the last two
cases are "to gj.ve to." The fact that a nonexclusive power is created by
the use of these words is further substantiated in other cases where the
courts reach the conclusion that none of the objects can be excluded,
because the word "to" or "unto" has been used in the instrument
creati11:g the power.16 Likewise the courts have held that the words "to
12

Kemp v. Kemp, 5 Ves. Jr. 849 at 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1795). '
McCormick v. Security Trust Co., 184 Ky. 25, 2II S. W. 196 (1919);
Melvin v. Melvin, 6 Md. 541 (1854); Stableton v. Ellison, 21 Ohio St. 527 (1871);
Neilson's Estate, 17 W.N.C. (Pa.) 158 (1885); Russell v. Kennedy, 66 Pa. 248
(1870); McKonkey's Appeal, 13 Pa. 253 (1850); Cathey v. Cathey, 9 Humph. (28
Tenn.) 470 (1848); Knight v. Yarbrough, l Gilmer (21 Va.) 27 (1820); Hudson v. Hudson's Adin'r, 6 Munf. (20 Va.) 352 (1819); Fowler v. Hunter, 3 Y. & J.
506, 148 Eng. Rep. 1279 (1829); Garthwaite v. Robinson, 2 Sim. 43, 57 Eng. Rep.
706 (1827); Wilson v. Piggott, 2 Ves. Jr. 351, 30 Eng. Rep. 668 (1794); Bennett v.
Honywood, Ambl. 708, 27 Eng. Rep. 459 (1772); Alexander v. Alexander, 2 Ves.
Sr. 640, 28 Eng. Rep. 408 (1755).
14
100 Ky. 212 at 215, 38 S. W. 7 (1896).
~ Craker v. Parrott, 2 Ch. Cas. 228 at 228, 22 Eng. Rep. 921 (1677).
16
Parker et al. v. Macbryde et al., (C.C.A. 4th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 932; In Re
Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935); Barrett's Exr. v.
Barrett, 166 Ky. 4II, 179 S. W. 396 (1915); Den v. Crawford, 3 Halsted (8 N.J.
18
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and among'' 11 and "to divide between" 1 ~ create a nonexclusive power,
and the donee in exercising it must give a s;are of the property to each
of the objects.
It now becomes apparent that there are at least four sets of words
that immediately tend to indicate a nonexclusive power in the absence
of qualifying language. It is true that in the various cases cited there
have been derivatives of the primary phrases or words, but somewhere
in the language one can find the "magical" words in one form or another. The task of classifying powers would be very simple if all cases
could immediately be placed in one of the four mentioned groups.
However, there are many cases in which the courts have held the
power to be nonexclusive, and nowhere can one find any of these
familiar phrases to serve as landmarks.
In Lippincott v. Ridgway 19 there were two distinctive phrases, the
first being a power to convey a certain fund "unto such of the brothers
and sisters," and subsequently an expression "my will being that my
said daughter Hannah shall in such case have power to dispose of the
same among her brothers and sisters." The first part of the instrument
seems to indicate that a power of selection has been given to the donee.
However, in deciding the case, the latter section was held to qualify the
former language, and the court said the power created thereby was nonexclusive. In an early English case 20 certain household goods were
given to the wife "upon trust and confidence that she would not dispose
thereof but for the benefit of her children." This power does not contain any of the familiar words that would indicate a nonexclusive
power, but the court held that none of the children could be excluded
in the appointment. A utilization of the words "all and every" is perhaps the strongest indication possible that the donor intended each object to share in the benefit of the appointment. This is substantiated by
the fact that there are few cases where the point has arisen, and the
L.) 90 (1825); Hodges v. Stegall, 169 Tenn. 202, 83 S. W. (2d) 901 (1935);
Thrasher v. Ballard, 35 W. Va. 524, 14 S. E. 232 (1891); Morgan d. Surman v.
Surman, l Taunt. 289, 127 Eng. Rep. 844 (1808); Vanderzee v. Aclom, 4 Ves. Jr.
771, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1797).
17
Cameron v. Crowley, 72 N.J. Eq. 681, 65 A. 875 (1907); In Re Lawler's
Will, 215 App. Div. 506, 213 N.Y. S. 723 (1926); Maddison v. Andrew, l Ves. Sr.
57, 27 Eng. Rep. 889 (1747).
18
Hawthorn v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885 (1904); Faloon v. Flannery,
74 Minn. 38, 76 N. W. 954 (1898); Wright v. Wright, 41 N.J. Eq. 382, 4 A. 855
(1886); Lloyd v. Fretz, 235 Pa. 538, 84 A. 450 (1912); Herrick v. Fowler, 108
Tenn. 410, 67 S. W. 861 (1902).
19
10 N.J. Eq. 164 at 166 (1854).
20
Gibson v. Kinven, l Vern. 66 at 66, 23 Eng. Rep. 315 (1682).
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courts have consistently held in those cases that these words did make
the power nonexclusive.21
Just as there are certain words which in themselves make the power
nonexclusive, so are there words which have been held to make the
power exclusive. In this latter class the words "to such of the" or
"among such of the" recur more frequently than others. The case of
Ingraham cu. Meade 22 involved a power to appoint a certain fund
"among such of the chil&en of 'R' and 'M' and in such proportions as
'M' may appoint." :Yhis is a typical case in which the donor used the
word '~such," and the court held that the power created thereby was
exclusive. The English interpretation of "such" .is about the same as
the American. In Brown cu. Higgs 23 the donee could appoint "to such
of the children of my nephew Samuel :Srow.n as my said nephew John
Brown shall think most deserving." The donee did not exercise the
, power, but the court, in giving all of them an equal share; said that
John Brown, if he had exercised the power, could have excluded any of
them that he wished. The other cases, both English and American,
would seem to bear out the f~ct that when the donee can appoint to
"such" he is given the power to exclude.24 It is likewise held that the
same result is reached whenever there is a power to appoint "to the
class or to any one." 25
·
There is another group of words which seem to have the same
effect in determining that the power is exclusive. The donee may be
given full power "to devise and bequeath the same, or any part thereof,
to ... my relations." 26 In such a case the donee has a power of selection. It would seem that the addition of the words "or any part thereof" is the deciding factor, because in the absence of these words the
power would undoubtedly be held to be nonexclusive. This r~sult may
not be logical if one interprets the language as giving the donee a discretion as to the amount of property over which he desires to exercise
21
Strutt v. Braithwaite, 5 De G. & Sm. 369, 64 Eng. Rep. u57 {1852); Menzey
v. Walker, Cases, t. Talb. 72, 25 Eng. Rep. 669 (1735).
22
3 Wall. Jr. (U.S. Cir Ct. Rep.) 32, 13 Fed. Cas. 50 (1855).
23
4 Ves. Jr. 708 at 709, 31 Eng. Rep. 366 (1799).
24 Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 406, 9 A. (2d) 3II (1940);
·
In Re Skidmore, 148 Misc. 569, 266 N.Y.S. 312 (1933); Wollen v. Tanner; 5 Ves.
Jr. 218, 31 Eng. Rep. 555 (1800).
25
Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, II S.W. (2d) 949 (1928); Cochran v. Elwell,
46 N.J. Eq. 333, 19 A. 672 (1890); Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head. (39 Tenn.) I (1858);
Rhett v. Mason, 18 Gratt (59 Va.) 541 (1868).
.
26 Levi v. Fidelity Trust and S. U. Co., 121 Ky. 82, 88 S. W. 1083 (1905);
Huling and others v. Fenner, 9 R.I. 410 at 411 (1870).
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the power, but the result may be justified if one regards it as a power
to give any desired_part (which might be nothing) to each of the objects.
In addition t6 the cases already cited there are other instances in
~hich the power has been held to be exclusive without the use of one
of the familiar terms. A donee was given the power to devise certain
property "to my said son or daughter." Here the word "to" would
seem to justify a decision that all should share. However, it was found
that the right to exclude did exist.27 This is not necessarily inconsistent
with the general rule, because the use of the conjunctive "or" changes
the meaning of the phrase.
In any case involving a term which is different from the enumerated types it is difficult to determine whether the power is exclusive or
nonexclusive. However, approximately eighty-four per cent of the
cases examined by the writer contained one of the following or similar
expressions: "among," "to," "to and among," "between," "or to any,"
"to such," or "to any part." While this does not infallibly indicate the
type of power it is reasonably accurate in the absence of other language.
In the cases which do not fall in one of the groups, it is often possible to
find these words in combination with others or in combination with
themselves. If such is the case it is possible to determine with reasonable certainty what the court will decide if called upon to determine
the exclusiveness of the power.
Therefore, in a case where there is an uncertainty as to the type of
power created, the following rule may be said to apply in the absence of
other language or circumstances indicating a contrary intent: Whenever
the instrument states that the donee has the power to appoint "to,"
"among," "to and among," or "between" specified objects, the power
created thereby is a nonexclusive power; but when the instrument
states that the donee shall appoint "to any," "to such," or "any part,"
the power created thereby is an exclusive power.

II
THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NONEXCLUSIVE POWER

A. Rule of Law
The legal consequences that arise from the determination that a
given power is nonexclusive have been changed by legislation in both
27

In Re Turle's Estate, 185 Minn. 490, 241 N. W. 570 (1932).
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England and the United States. The material included in this-subdivision must therefore be read in connection with the material found
in subdivision IV.28
One may say that the determination that g. power is nonexclusive
is a legal consequence in itself. The author does not adopt this line of
reasoning. Whether a power is nonexclusive or not depends on either
the actual or "court determined" intent of the donor. But the legal
consequences of a nonexclusive power are dependent on the law at a
given time in the particular jurisdiction. Thus the fact that nonexclusive powers may be treated in the same manner as exclusive powers does
not warrant a discarding of the classification. It is true that there may
be a logical reason for holding that one cartnot have a nonexclusive
power unless certain consequences follow, but the term "nonexclusive
power" is not used in this sense in the discussion.
If one determines that the donor created a nonexclusive power it
is at once apparent that the donor must have intended each object to
share in the appointment. That each object receive a share in the appointment should be one of the most important legal consequences of a
nonexclusive power. It would seem to be so clear that there would
be little chance of any litigation over the matter, but this has been dis- •
proved by the numerous cases which have arisen.
In England the courts determined at an early <;late that any appointment under a nonexclusive power which exhausted all of the
property without giving a share to each object failed entirely.20 The .
courts reached a similar result where there were several appointments
which took effect together, and in a like manner exhausted the fund
without giving a share to each of the objects.80• In the case of Vanderzee
v. Aclom 31 the donee of the power gave a share to each object, but the
court held the power to be improperly executed for other reasons. In
his opinion Lord Alvanley said, "It is now perfectly established, that,
whenever a power is given to appoint to and among several persons, the
power is not well executed, unless some part is allotted to each." 82 The
The. author has adopted the arrangement followed to give a clearer picture of the
development of the law. The reader must remember that the statements contained in
this section are qualified by the statements in subdivision IV, especially in regard to the
English law.
·
·
29 Craker v. Parrott, 2 Ch. Cas. 228, 22 Eng. Rep. 921 (1677).
3
FARWELL, PoWERs, 3rd ed., 417 (1916).
31
•4 Ves. Jr. 771, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1797).
82
Id. at 784.
28

°
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opinion expressed by Lord Alvanley in that case would seem to be the
almost unanimous view taken by the English courts.83 In fact there
seems to be no case in which the rule has ever been questioned, and the
writers have never intimated that there might be a different holding.
In the United States the problem has arisen in twenty-one jurisdictions, and with one exception the courts have seemed to follow the
English view. In some of the cases the question has arisen in such a
manner that it is impossible to say emphatically that the court decides
each must share where the power is nonexclusive, but from the language used such an assumption would appear to be logical.
In the case of Parker v. Macbryde 84 the testator gave certain property to his niece for life and then gave her a nonexclusive power to appoint by will to her brothers and sisters of the whole blood. The niece
made an appointment outside the class and the court held that the exercise of the power was void because the appointment should have been
confined to the persons designated by the testator. The decision also
intimated that each of the class was entitled to receive a share. From
the result of this case it would ·seem to follow that the federal rule is a
mere restatement of the view adopted by the English courts.
In Alabama,85 California, 86 Florida,87 Georgia,88 Illinois,89 Kentucky,40 Maryland,41 Minnesota,42 Missouri,48 New Jersey,4 4 New
88 Morgan d. Surman v. Surman, I Taunt. 289, 127 Eng. Rep. 844 (1808);
Vanderzee v. Adorn, 4 Ves. Jr. Jr. 771, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1897); Kemp v. Kemp, 5
Ves. Jr. 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1795); Wilson v. Piggott, 2 Ves. Jr. 351, 30 Eng.
Rep. 668 (1794); Burleigh v. Pearson, I Ves. Sr. 281, 27 Eng. Rep. 1032 (1749);
Menzey v. Walker, Cases, t. Talb. 72, 25 Eng. Rep. 669 (1735); Gibson v. Kinven, 1
Vern. 66, 23 Eng. Rep. 315 (1682); Craker v. Parrott, 2 Ch. Cas. 228, 22 Eng.
Rep. 921 (1677).
84
(C.C.A. 4th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 932.
85
Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1893).
86
ln Re Sloan's Estate, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935).
81
See Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51 ( I 8 53).
88
New v. Potts, 55 Ga. 420 (1875).
89
Hawthorne v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885 (1904).
40
McCormick v. Security Trust Co., ,184 Ky. 25, 211 S. W. 196 (1919); Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 411, 179 S. W. 396 (1915); Clay v. Smallwood, 100
Ky. 212, 38 S. W. 7 (1896).
41
Melvin v. Melvin, 6 Md. 541 (1854).
42
Faloon v. Flannery, 74 Minn. 38, 76 N. W. 954 (1898).
48
See Fries v. Fries, 306 Mo. 101, 267 S. W. 116 (1924).
44
Cameron v. Crowley, 72 N.J. Eq. 681, 65 A. 875 (1907); Wright v. Wright
41 N.J. Eq. 382, 4 A. 855 (1886); Lippincott v. Ridgway, 10 N.J. Eq. 164 (1854);
Den v. Crawford, 3 Halsted (8 N.J.L.) 90 (1825).
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York,4 6 North Carolina,46 Ohio,47 Pennsylvania,48 Rhode Island,4°
South Carolina,5° Tennessee,51 Virginia,5 2 and West Virginia,°3 cases
have arisen which apparently, from the decisions, adopt the English
rule as regards the nonexclusive powers.
In a New Hampshire case54 the testator bequeathed a fund to
others "for the benefit and com.fort of my brothers and sister." This
is not a situation where a power of appointment has been conferred,
but it is analogous to that situation. In distributing the money one of
the brothers received nothing, and, in an action concerning the distribution, the argument was presented that there was not such a discretion
that this brother could be excluded under the wording of the instrument. The court refused to set aside the distribution and said that the
doctrine of nonexclusive appointm~nts should not be extended to such
a case. The court did not discuss the legal consequence in a case which
involved a pure power of appointment, and no such case has been decided in that jurisdiction. However, it is possible that it would refuse
to follow the weight of authority if the question ever arose.
With the exception of the above cited New Hampshire case, no
court has ever questioned the fact that all objects must share in the
exercise of a nonexclusive power.. The.Kentucky court has said that it
would be better if more powers of appointment were held to be exclusive; but, apart from this, there is little criticism of the present view.55
If the courts adopted the Kentucky suggestion it would be a step toward
simplifying the problem, because there could be little objection to any
action on the part of the donee if he_had the right to exclude any of the
objects.
45
46

In Re Lawler's Will, 215 App. Div. 506, 213 N.Y.S. 723 (1926).

See Little v. Bennett, 58 N.C. 156 (1859).
'
Stableton v. Ellison, 21 Ohio St. 527 (1871).
48
In Re Sinnott's Estate, 310 Pa. 463, 165 A. 244 (1933); Neilson's Estate, 17
W.N.C. (Pa.) 158 (1885); McKonkey's Appeal, 13 Pa. 253 (1850).
49
See Huling and others v. Fenner, 9 R.I. 410 (1870).
50
Seibels v. Whatley, 2 Hill Eq. (51 S.C.) 605 (1837).
51
Cathey v. Cathey, 9 Humph. (28 Tenn.) 470 (1848).
52
Hudson v. Hudson's Admr, 20 Va. 352 (1819); Carrington's·Exrs. v. Belt, 6
Munf. (20 Va.) 374 (1819).
·
·
58
Thrasherv. Ballard, 35 W. Va. 524, 14S.E. 232 (1891).
54
City of Portsmouth v. Shackford, 46 N.H. 423 (1866).
55
Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 4u, 179 S. W. 396 (1915) (The main argument concerned the illusory appointment doctrine, and the statement was· made in
support of the• Kentucky view).
47
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B. Theories of the Rule

There has never been any extended discussion of the reasqns behind
the rule. In a few of the English cases where the court of equity interfered because of the insubstantiality of the sum, it was mentioned that
there was a fraud on the exercise of the power. 56 One of the English
writers also suggests that there is a trust; and, therefore, the court will
grant relief so that the trust will be fulfilled. 57 While there is merit in
both of these rationalizations, the former would seem to be the more
sound. When the donor creates a nonexclusive power the donee is
given certain duties by the terms of the instrument. These duties are
well defined; and to allow the donee to do some act other than that
prescribed by the donor would be allowing a fraud to be perpetrated
on both the donor and the objects of the power. It is also possible to
consider it as a breach of a trust, but in the interest of clarity and reasonableness it would seem that the trust theory should not be extended to
such a degree as to include the nonexclusive power cases.

C. Special Problems
There are many other problems which may arise in the exercise
of a nonexclusive power of appointment. In fact it may be said that
the number is limited only by the imagination of the writer. In order
to understand these problems it is necessary that they be discussed
separately, and for the sake of brevity the author will include only the
questions that recur most frequently.
I.

The Exclusion of Afterborn Children

In any power that is exercisable by deed and under which the
objects are members of a class that may increase in number, it may be
asked whether the donee has the right to exercise the power before the
maximum membership of the class has been determined. If he cannot
exercise the power until that time, it means that a power can be validly
exercised at the moment, but subsequent events may make it void.
In the case of Dyke v. Sylvester 58 a nonexclusive power of appointment was given to X. The donee, X, made an appointment to all
56 Spencer v. Spencer, 5 Ves. Jr. 362, 31 Eng. Rep. 630 (1800); Vanderzee v.
Aclom, 4 Ves. Jr. 771, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1797); Kemp v. Kemp, 5 Ves. Jr. 849,
31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1795).
57 CHANCE, POWERS, § II22 (1841).
58 12 Ves. Jr. 126, 33 Eng. Rep. 48 (1806).
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but it was suggested that more children might be born and that they
would be entitled to a share. For this reason counsel said that the .
exercise of the power might be void. However, the court upheld X's
appointment, stating that the possibility of afterborn children could
not affect the validity of the appointments. It was said that this had
always been the view of the court, and it would adhere to this rule until
corrected by higher authority.
This case would seem to hold that an appointment under a nonexclusive power is valid if a share is given to all objects then in esse,
even though more objects might later be born. If this is true, one might
say that the donee has the right to exclude any object that comes into
being after the date at which the power becomes exercisable; he could·
have exercised the power at that date and thus legally omitted the
object, and, therefore, there is no valid reason why he cannot exclude
him at a later period, because as a practical matter the same result
would be reached.
The right to omit children born after the power becomes exercisable
cannot be supported by authority because no case has ever been decided
where this particular problem was involved. The Restatement of the
Law of Property does not even attempt to advance an opinion as to the
validity of an appointment where a share is given to all objects then
in esse if there is a possibility of an increase in the number of objects.
The Restatement says that there are many factors which may enter into
a determination of the question, and for this reason it is impossible to
state a general rule. 59
•
Chance says that the donee under such a power could make the appointment to all of the objects in being, and also include a statement
that afterborn· objects ~re to share.60 If the donor of the power wished
to be sure that this result would be accomplished, he should have expressly stated that this was his wish.
Exercise In Favor of A Deceased Object
Closely related to an exercise when there is a possibility of future
issue is the exercise in favor of a deceased object. The general rule is
that an appointment by will lapses if the appointee dies before the
donee. 61 This question usually arises only in a case where the objects
2.

59 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 3~1 (1), comment e (1940).
6 CHANCE, PowERS, § 1080 (1841).
61 I SIMES, FUTURE lNTERES:rs, §259 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,

°

(1940). As to the effect
(1940).

of

the lapse statutes see

PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,

§ 349
§ 350
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are actually named. In a case where they are designated as a class they
are not actually members of the class unless they survive the execution
of the power. The result reached where they are named may seem
strange if one adopts the "relation back" doctrine. Under that doctrine
the appointee is said to take under the instrument creating the power
and not under the instrument that executes the power. This would
mean that the appointee's interest came into being when the donor
created the power, and, therefore, if he was living at that time he
should be allowed to take.
·
However, there is a method of justifying the result. In the instrument which creates the power one can add the words, "if they are alive
when the execution takes place." ,;I'hus it can be seen that the donee
would have no right to appoint to an object who was deceased at the
time the appointment was made. In Maddison v. Andrew 62 the donee
in exercising a power gave a share to a deceased daughter. The court
held that the exercise was void in so far as it attempted to provide for
the deceased object. A similar result would probably be reached even
in a case of an appointment made directly to the representative of a
deceased object.68
It is possible that in one instance there may be said to be an exception to the general rule. In a case in which the instrument creating the
power also vests an interest in the objects, the fact that one of them
dies will not prohibit him from sharing in the fund. In a Pennsylvania case 64 the wife of the testator was given a life estate and then full
power to allot and divide the same equally among the four children of
the testator. One of the children died before the wife executed the
power, and in her division she gave the fund to the three remaining
children. An action was brought by the administrator of the deceased
child, and the court held he was entitled to a ·fourth of the property.
In reaching that conclusion the court determined that the interest of the
object vested at the time the power was created and that the only right
the wife had was to divide the property into four equal parts.
This case may be considered as one in which there is no actual power
involved. The situation of the donee can be said to be similar to that
of a trustee under a "dry trust." On the other hand, one could say that
the donee has no discretion as to the size of the shares nor as to the
62
l Ves. Sr. 57, 27 Eng. Rep. 889 (1747). A similar result was reached in the
United States in Herrick v. Fowler, 108 Tenn. 410, 67 S. W. 861 (1902).
68
CHANCE, POWERS,§ 1090 (1841).
64
Bryce's Estate, 238 Pa. 519, 86 A. 286 (1913).
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objects who receive the shares, but that the donee does have the right
to say which share shall be given to a particular object. If one accepts
this latter view, it is possible to understand that there may be an exception to the rule that the donee can not appoint to a deceased object.

3. Validity of Partial Appointments

If there is a nonexclusive power to appoint by deed, the donee may
exercise it by giving a portion of the fund to only one of the objects.
While this is in reality an exclusive exercise of the power, it is said to be
valid because there is property left which can be used to satisfy the demands of the other objects when the donee desires. 65 This result may
also be reached if the donee is confined to a testamentary execution. If
the donee's will do~ not entirely exhaust the fund, the remainder may
go to the objects in default of appointment. This would satisfy the requirement that all objects.were to receive a share providing the objects
are the ones who will take in default of appointment.
There are many other ways in which exclusive appointments are
valid only .because subsequent events make them so. It is possible that
the exercise will be made in favor of a stranger and some of the objects.
In this case the exercise in favor of the stranger is void, but the court
may hold that the other part of the appointment is valid. If this is true
the share that was improperly given will pass to the other objects, assuming they are the takers in default, and thus satisfy the condition
that all are to share in the appointment.
In Ranking v. Barnes 66 the donee of a nonexclusive power gave
one third of the fund to one of the objects, but the exercise was void as
to one half of that appointment. Later the donee exhausted the fund
without giving all of the objects a share. T.q.e court said that, since a
part of the first appointment was void, this sum would go by default;
and, because the objects themselves took in default of appointment, the
requirement that all should have a share had been satisfied. Thus the
latter appointment was valid, but it would have been void had it not
been for the subsequent failure of a portion of the first appointment.
'It is also possible that one of the objects who receives a share may
die before the exercise takes effect, and thus his share will .pass by de65 Stableton v. Ellison, 21 ·Ohio St. 527 (1871); Russell v. Kennedy, 66 Pa. 248
(1870); Wilson
Piggott, 2 Ves. Jr. 351, 30 Eng. Rep. 668 (1794); Simpson v.
Paul, 2 Eden 34, 28 Eng. Rep. 808 (1761); CHANCE, PowERs, §§ 1077-1088
(1841).
66
33 L.J.Ch. 539, IO Jur. N.S. 463, 12 W.R. 565 (1864).

v.

1944}

PowERS OF APPOINTMENT

fault of appointment. In this way prior appointments will be valid even
though they fail 'to give a share to each of the objects, assuming that
the takers in default are the objects of the power.
One question that arises in connection with this problem concerns
the division that is to be made of the remainder which is to go by default. As a general rule the courts hold that equality is equity and give
the fund in equal proportions to all of the objects. This procedure may
be criticized on the theory that some of the objects have received a
share through the partial exercise, and they should therefore not be allowed to share equally in the division of the remainder. In support
of the view that it is to be divided equally, it can be said that the donee
by favoring them evidently meant them to have an advantage, and
that it would hot be right for the courts to attempt to equalize the
share by having them account for the portion they received through
the appointment.
The case of Stableton v. Ellison 61 adopts the view that the objects
must account for any sum they receive by appointment before they can
share in a division of the remainder. In that case the wife made partial
appointments of her husband's land and died before it was completely
exhausted. The court said that it should have been appointed equally,
and that, therefore, in dividing the remainder all objects would be
given an equal share taking into account the amount that each object
received by appointment.
The object who takes solely in default of appointment can advance
three arguments in support of the proposition that objects provided for
by appointment should be made to account before sharing in the remainder. The object can claim that the appointment in reality means
that the remainder is to go to the objects who have been omitted by the
terms of the instrument. To adopt this reasoning means that it is necessary to read the provision into the instrument, and this is far from
desirable. The object might also claim that the appointment is really
conditioned on the fact that the appointee will claim no part of the fund
to go by default. A third possibility is to say that the appointees are
~topped to claim any of the remainder in view of the fact that they
have already been provided for. Of these three the second would appear to be the most reasonable and by far the better view.
The Restatement of the Law of Property says that in many of the
instruments creating a power of appointment it is provided that no
67

21 Ohio St. 527 (1871).
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object shall take any share in default of appointment unless he shall
bring all portions already received into the fund to go by default. This
result could also be reached if the same or a similar provision were included in the instrument exercising the power.68
4. Rights of-Objects Where There are Various Classes of Property
In many cases where there is a power of appointment the subject
of the power will consist of both realty and personalty. When this
occurs it is necessary to determine whether or not the objects are entitled to a share of each class of property or whether they are merely
entitled to share of fl?.e property as a whole.
In Morgan d. Surman v. Surman 69 there were both realty and personalty, and the court held that the donee could give the realty to one
and the personalty to the other of the objects. In a comment on this
case by Sir Edward Sugden, it was stated that the decision in the case
would warrant a donee under any circumstances in making an appointment of only one class of property to an object.10 The rule stated in the
Morgan case has received support in this country,11 but according to
Chance the interpretation of the case by Sir Edward Sugden may be
too broad. 12 There is a Virginia case which would seem to support the
view adopted by Chance because the court held that each of the objects
was entitled to a portion of each class of property. 73
The writer does not think that the cases which deal with the point
are necessarily in conflict. It would seem that the donor, by the language he uses in creating the power, controls the decision jn any particular case. In one case it might be possible to give one object the
realty and another the personalty, while in another case it would be impossible to do this because of the language of the instrument creating
the power. However, as a general rule it is probably true that, where
there are different classes of property, it is sufficient if an object receives a share from one of the classes.

a

5. Special Factors Which Might Warrant An Exclusion
It seems clear that there are many factors which warrant the courts
in upholding an appointment that excl~des some of the objects. In
68

PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 361(1), comment g (1940).
1 Taunt. 289, 127 Eng. Rep. 844 (1808).
70 SucDEN, PoWERS, 8th ed., 942 (1861).
71
Biggins v. Lambert, 213 Ill. 625, 73 N. E. 371 (1904); Melvin v. Melvin, 6
Md.. 541 (1854).
72
CHANCE, PoWERs, § 1086 (1841).
13
Carrington's Exrs. v. Belt, 6 Munf. (20 Va.) 374 (1819).
69
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many of the cases involving powers of appointments the donee of the
power is the wife or husband of the donor. In these cases the power is
probably given in order to guarantee to the donee the respect and affection of the objects. In such a case it would seem that the conduct of
the objects would govern their right to share in the subject matter of
the power. This was the view taken by the courts in the early cases,
but it has recently been looked on with disfavor, and at the present
time apparently the misconduct of the objects is no justification for excluding them from sharing in the fund. 74
There is another instance where the object may be lawfully omitted
in the exercise of the power. In a case in which the object is provided
for by other means, it is possible that the donee may omit him in the
appointment. 75 In Hatchett v. Hatchett 76 the donee, in ex~rcising the
power, said that one of the objects had been provided for by him, and
therefore he was not allowing him to share in this property ( which was
property left the donee by his wife). The court approved of this exclusion and said that, for the object to be entitled to a share of this property, it was necessary for him to show that he in fact had not received
anything from the source mentioned.
The main question which arises in connection with this problem is
whether or not the specific gift, which the object received, will warrant
an exclusion from sharing in the property over which there was a power.
There are three situation's which might arise. The object might receive
another gift from the donor of the power, he might receive something
from the donee of the power, or he might receive something from a
third person. In the latter instance, that of a gift from a third person, it
would not be logical to hold that the object could be excluded, since
the fund that he received in no way came from the property over which
the donee had a power. To permit a gift from an outside source to
affect the object's right to take under the power would aHow the element of chance to become the governing factor in an exclusion. There
is also reason to believe that a gift by the donor does not justify an exclusion. The donor undoubtedly knows of the possibility of sharing
under the appointment, and therefore, if a gift is given in addition to
this, it would seem that the donor intended the object to have both
unless he specifically stated that this was not his intention.
74 SUGDEN, PowERS, 8th ed., 941 (1861).
7
G Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1893); Long v. Long, 5
Ves. Jr. 445, 31 Eng. Rep. 674 (1800); Parsons v. Parsons, 9 Mod. 464, 88 Eng.

Rep. 577 (1744).
76
103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1893).
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Thus we are confined to permitting an exclusion only in the case
where the gift comes from the donee. Even here there may be a strong
argument that the donee. should state in the gift that he is giving it in
lieu of a share under the exercise of the power. However, if the donee
does exclude the object when he exercises the power, it can be inferred
from his action that he intended the gift to be a substitute for a share
under the power of appointment.
There are very.few cases which' have presented this problem and the
courts have not attempted to rationalize their holdings. However, it
has been held that a relationship is necessary between the gift actually
received and the subject of the power.77 Thus it would seem that the
only instan~e in which another gift would justify an exclusion is when
it comes through the donee of the power, and is of sufficient value to
warrant an exclusion.

6. Consequence When Appointment ls Void Or Power ls Unexercised
In any case in which the donee fails to make an appointment, it
would appear that the court could exercise the power only if it is said
to be in trust. This is true whether it is exercisable by deed, by will, or
by either.78 If the court does exercise the power, the subject matter
will be given to the objects in equal shares because of the equitable
maxim that equality is equif:Y..79
If the attempt of the- donee to exercise the power is invalid, the
court will set aside the execution and distribute the property itself. 80
As a general rule it will be distributed equally among the objects in the
same manner as though there had been no attempt to make an appointment. 81
In Morris v. Owen 82 the testator gave his wife the power to dispose
of the property among his ( the testator's) children. The donee gave a
portion of the property to the testator's child, but also made an appointment to the grandchildren. The court found that the power ·did not
authorize a gift to grandchildren, and therefore found that the exercise
77

Parsons v. P~rsons,

9 Mod. 464, 88 Eng. Rep. 577 (1744).

78 I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,

§ 274 (1936).
McGaughey's Admr. v. Henry, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 383 (1854).
80
Degman v. Degman, 98 Ky. 717, 34 S. W. 523 (1896); Lippincott v. Ridgway, ION. J. Eq. 164 (1854); Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head. (39 Tenn.) 1, 73 Am.
Dec. 186 (1858); Knight v. ,Yarbrough, l Gilmer (21 Va.) 27 (1820); Gibson v.
Kinven, l Vern. 66, 23 Eng. Rep. 315 (1682).
81
Supra, note 80.
82
2 Call. (6 Va.) 520 (1801).
79
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was partially void. The court then determined that the portion of the
property which had not been validly appointed should go as intestate
property of the donor. The reasoning of the court is not clear, but it
might be said that the power was not in trust, and therefore the court
would not exercise it.
The courts have not distinguished between an invalid exercise by
will and an invalid exercise by deed. In each case the court reached the
same result, namely, that the exercise is void. If the appointment is
void the legal effect is that the donee has not exercised the power. Thus
it may be said that the donee should be allowed to make another execution if it is possible. However, no cases, which followed this line of
reasoning,88 have been found.

III
THE ILLUSORY APPOINTMENT DocTRINE

A. England
It is seldom questioned that an exercise of a nonexclusive power is
void in any case where one of the objects does not receive a share of the
property. Thus, according to the English common law, an excluded
object may obtain relief in a court of law where he is given nothing,
but if the donee gives him as much as one cent he cannot complain;
the result may prove to be unfair, but at law any sum, no matter how
small, is regarded as a substantial sum. 84
In order to minimize the obvious injustice which resulted from the
view taken by the courts of law, an object was given the right in equity
to have the appointment set aside if the share he received was not substantial. This equitable relief, which was available to the object, came
to be known as the illusory appointment doctrine and developed hand
in hand with the legal view providing that some part should be given
to each object. In any instance in which the power was exclusive the
donee could give,as small a share as he desired, and the object could
not come into equity and object because the portion given was not
substantial. 85 There is not the slightest doubt that this is the proper
83
It is difficult to prove that the donee is still capable of exercising in the reported
cases. However, no case has been found which intimated that he could attempt to
exercise again.
84
Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1893); CHANCE, PowERs,
§§urn, n17 (1841); SucoEN, PoWERs, 8th ed., 938 (1861).
85
Ingraham v. Meade, 3 Wall. Jr. (U. S. Cir Ct. Rep.) 32, 13 Fed. Cas. 50
(1855).
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result in such a case; in any case in which the donee has the power to
omit entirely he should also have the right to give as small a share
as he desires.
In England the illusory appointment doctrine was definitely established in the case of Gibson v. Kinven. 86 In that case the wife of the
testator was given certain household goods, the testator being sure that
"she would not dispose of them except for the benefit of their children."
In exercising the power thus created, the wife gave one of the children
five shillings. The size of the fund was not disclosed in the opinion of
the court, but the exercise of the power was held to be voidable on the
ground that the giving of five shillings, when compared with the other
amounts, created too great an inequality. It is impossible from the decided cases to place this illusory appointment doctrine on any established basis of legal principle. However, if the fund is large and the
object receives only a small portion, the practical result to the object is
the same as being totally excluded. It is possible that courts of equity
regard the exercise thus, and determine that, as far as this particular
object is concerned, there has not been an exercise of the power, and
that he is entitled to a substantial share before he need recognize the
fact that there has been an exercise. 87 Regardless of the lack of a definite theory upon which to place the doctrine, the courts of equity in
England continued to grant relief where an insubstantial sum was given
until the doctrine was abolished by legislative act. 88

B. United States
In the United States there has been no unanimity of judicial opinion
concerning the illusory appointment doctrine. The Restatment of the
Law of Property provides that any exercise of a nonexclusive power
is void if a substantial share is not given to each donee. 89 This statement of the law differs from the English view in one material aspect.
86

1 Vern. 66, 23 Eng. Rep. 315 (1682). This is the first case found which
actually involved the doctrine, but it was intimated that the share should be substantial
in Craker v. Parrott, 2 Ch. Cas. 288, 22 Eng. Rep. 921 (1677).
87
Kemp. v. Kemp, 5 Ves. Jr. 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1795).
88
Dyke v. Sylvester, 12 Ves. Jr. 126, 33 Eng. Rep. 48 {-1806); Mocatta v.
Lousada, 12 Ves. Jr. 123, 33 Eng. Rep. 47 {1806); Bax v. Whitebread, IO Ves. Jr.
31, 32 Eng. Rep. 755 {1804); Spencer v. Spencer, 5 Ves. Jr. 362, 31 Eng. Rep. 630
(1800); Vanderzee v. Aclom, 4 Ves. Jr. 771, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1797); Pocklington
v. Bayne, 1 Bro. C. C. 450, 28 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1785); Alexander v. Alexander, 2
Ves. Sr. 640, 28 Eng. Rep. 408 (1755). For a discussion of the legislative changes
see infra, subdivision IV.
,
89
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 361 (1) (1940).
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If it is true that the exercise of the power is void because an illusory
sum is given, the courts of law will grant relief to the donee, and there
will be no need for equitable relief. However, no decisions have been
found which support the view adopted by the Restatement. In a recent
federal case, the court, in its decision, cited with approval the above
section of the Restatement.90 However, from the facts of the case, it is
apparent that some of the objects were omitted in the exercise of the
power; thus, the discussion in relation to illusory appointments is
dictum, and not authority for the proposition that an exercise is void in
any case where each donee does not receive a substantial share.
In many of the states there are decisions which intimate that the
old English rule will be followed when the problem arises.91 In those
jurisdictions, it is probable that the object will have to go into equity
and have the appointment set aside. In Hatchett v. Hatchett 92 the
plaintiff was one of the objects of a power of appointment. The donee
of the power omitted the plaintiff because he had been provided for by
other means. The court held that the appointment was valid and, if
the plaintiff wished to assert that his share was illusory, it was necessary for him to go into equity because all shares are regarded as substantial at law.
There is an opposing line of decisions containing dicta which
reject the illusory appointment doctrine.93 It is true that in these cases
the portion of the opinion dealing with the illusory appointment is
only dictum, but it is safe to predict that a court in these jurisdictions
would refuse to give relief if and when the question is presented.
In a Missouri case certain property was given to the wife of the
testator and the court held that she took the fee. The plaintiff contended that the instrument created a life estate with a power of appointment, and that the share given to him was illusory. In the decision it was said that even if the contention was correct the plaintiff
90

Parker et al. v. Macbryde et al., (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 932.
Hatchett v. Hatchett, 103 Ala. 556, 16 So. 550 (1893); In Re Sloan's Estate,
7 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 46 P. (2d) 1007 (1935); New v. Potts, 55 Ga. 420 (1875);
McGaughey's Admr. v. Henry, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 383 (1854); City of Portsmouth v.
Shackford, 46 N.H. 423 (1866); Den. v. Crawford, 3 Halsted (8 N.J.L.) 90 (1825);
Herrick v. Fowler, 108 Tenn. 410, 67 S. W. 861 (1902); Cruse v. McKee, 2 Head
(39Tenn.) 1 (1858); Knightv. Yarbrough, l Gilmer (21 Va.) 27 (1820); Thrasher
v. Ballard, 36 W. Va. 524, 14 S. E. 232 (1891).
92
103 Ala. 556, 16 So., 550 (1893).
93
Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51 (1853); Fries v. Fries, 306 Mo. 101, 267 S. W.
II6 (1924); Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust So., 126 N.J. Eq. 406, 9 A. (2d) 311
(1940); Fronty v. Fronty's Exrs., l Bailey Eq. (S.C. Eq.) 517 (1833).
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could not complain "unless this court adopts the doctrine of illusory
appointments. That doctrine now has nothing in the way of logic to
support it in a case like this, and has never been applied as a rule of
decision by any American court save one." 94
In addition to the dicta already discussed, there are several states
which have passed on the doctrine nf illusory appointments, and the
majority of them reject the English theory. Illinois,95 Pennsylvania,96
and Tennessee 97 have refused to set aside an appointment on the
ground that the share given to one object was nominal. The only state
which reaches a different conclusion is Kentucky. 98
In the first Pennsylvania case to announce the doctrine of that state
the donee was given the power to appoint three hundred and twentysix acres of land among four of his children. Two of the children re. ceived three acres each, and it was -claimed that this was an illusory
share. The court held the execution to be valid. In the decision it was
mentioned that such a distribution was always valid at law, and there
was no reason for introducing the equitable rule of illusory appointments; which the English courts had found so difficult to administer.99
In Hodges cv. Stegall 100 the objects claimed that the share given
them was too small to be considered a substantial sum. To support
their contention the objects claimed that according to previous decisions
the state had adopted the illusory appointment doctrine. In the decision the court ·admitted there was dicta in earlier cases that the doctrine .
was accepted in that state, but the court was of the opinion this could.
not be taken as the law of the state. Because of this the appointments
were held to be valid.
The early Kentucky cases contained dicta to the effect that the
illusory appointment doctrine would be applied in that state. However, it was not until the case of Barrett's Exr. cv. Barrett 101 that it could
be said with certainty that Kentucky would set aside an appointment on
Fries v. Fries, 306 Mo. IOI at 109, 267 S. W. n6 (1924).
Hawthorne v. Ulrich, 207 Ill. 430, 69 N. E. 885 (1904).
96
In Re Sinnott's Estate, 310 Pa. 463, 165 A. 244 (1933); Lloyd v. Fretz, 235
Pa. 538, 84 A~ 450 (1912); Graeff v. DeTurk, 44 Pa. 527 (1863).
97 Hodges v. Stegall, 169 Tenn. 202, 83 S. W. (2d) 901 (1935).
98 McCormick v. Security Trust Co., 184 Ky. 25, 2II S. W. 196 '(1919);
Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 4II, 179 S. E. 396 (1915). See Clay v. Smallwood,
100 Ky. 212, 38 S. W. 7 (1896); Degman v. Degman, 98 Ky. 717, 34 S. W. 523
(1896).
99 Graeff v. DeTurk, 44 Pa. 527 (1863).
100
169 Tenn. 202, 83 S. W. (2d) 901 (1935).
lOl 166 Ky. 4II, 179 s. w. 396 (1915).
94
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the ground that a nominal sum had been given. In the decision Hanna,
"If an analysis of these cases leaves any doubt, however, that
the illusory appointment doctrine is the" law of this State, we have no
hesitation now in adopting it as a competent rule in the testing of the
execution of non-exclusive powers."· 102

J., said:

C. Factors Which Determine That a Share is Illusory
One of the arguments for refusing to adopt the illusory appointment doctrine fo the difficulty in determining when a given share is
illusory. The courts have been unable to agree on a dividing line between a substantial share and one that is nominal. It may be that there
are many factors which would enter into such a determination, and in
order to understand them it is necessary that they be discussed separately.
r. Amount Of the Appointment
In general it can be said that the value of the sum given is not one
of the determinative characteristics in deciding the substantiality of the
appointment. In Vanderzee v. Aclom Lord Alvanley said: 108 "It is
clear, the mere amount of the sum will not determine, whether it is
illusory, or not. It must be connected with the power and the extent
of it."
In regard to personal property the amount or size of the appointment is of less importance than the same factor in relation to realty.
Certain sums are said to be nominal merely because of their value.
Some writers believe that one shilling, five shillings, or one guinea
could never be a substantial amount.10,1 This would be true in most
cases, but it is possible that a fund might be so small that an equal share
would only amount to five shillings. If this were the situation there
could be no doubt that an appointment of that sum would be valid. In
deciding the validity of an appointment of personal property the courts
have placed little importance on the size of the fund which was allotted,
and it is of little ajd in determining when a given share is illusory.105
When the fund over which the donee has the power consists of
realty there are two aspects in relation to the size of the appointment.
Id. at 417.
4 Ves. Jr. 771 at 775, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1797).
104 CHANCE, POWERS, § n51 (1841).
105 Spencer v. Spencer, 5 Ves. Jr. 36z, 31 Eng. Rep. 630 (1800); Kemp v.
Kemp, 5 Ves. Jr. 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1795); Burrell v. Burrell, Ambl. 660,
z7 Eng. Rep. 428 (1768).
102
108

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

1

[ Vol. 42

The object may be given a life estate, which is in effect an eleµient of
size, or there may be a gift of a very small acreage of land. Most
powers will not permit the donee to appoint only a life estate to one of
the objects.106 This would seem to depend upon an interpretation of
the language of the instrument, and under the usual terms there is little
chance to say that the donor intended a life estate to be given.
In Pocklington v. Bayne 101 there was an undisclosed acreage of real
estate. Two of the objects were given an acre for life and the appointment was held to be illusory. It cannot be determined whether it was
the restriction to a life estate or whether it was the fact that only one
acre was allotted that invalidated the exercise of the power. It is probable that the decision was based on both factors, for it is unlikely that
' an increase in the acreage alone would have made the appointment
substantial. No definite rule can be laid down in relation to realty, but
if one considers size as also including the quantum of the estate it is
probable that size alone would have an effect in determining substantiality.
The element of time also enters into the determination of the sum,
size, or value of an appointment. This is especially true if the subject
of the power consists of stocks or bonds, which can fluctuate in value. If
the s-.;ibject matter does consist of bonds, the donee may appoint by will,
and at the time the division is made the appointments may be equal.
Later events may alter economic conditions to such an extent that the
appointmeIJ.tS will be grossly unequal when they take effect, and it
would be necessary to determine whether to consider the values when
the will was drawn or when the object actually received the property.
The latter choice is the better, unless it is necessary to find an intent on
the part of the donee to give an illusory sum. Even if it is necessary
to find this intent it would appear t_hat a failure to change the will
would imply an intent to give the object a nominal sum. However, the
author does not believe intent to be an important factor in deciding
the substantiality of ~ sum.
2.

The Relationship of the App?intment to the Fund

The most important single factor in determining whether an appointment, is illusory is the relation of the appointment to the fund
over which the donee exercises the power. If the courts would realize
this fact there would be far less confusion in the cases. In Barrett's Exr.
106

Stuyvesant v. Neil, 67 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 16 (1883).
Bro. C. C. 450, 28 Eng. Rep. 1234 (1785).
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v. Barrett the idea was stated in the following manner: 108 "True it is
that one thousand dollars is a substantial sum of money in itself; but the
question here is, as we think, its relation to the whole of the amount to
be distributed pursuant to the power."
Many of the English judges, especially Sir William Grant, took an
entirely different view of the question. This judge adopted the position
that he would only declare a given sum to be illusory when that same
sum had been held to be nominal in an earlier decision based on the
same facts. 100 Since it is very improbable that two cases will ever arise
with exactly the same set of facts, the learned judge must have realized
that his statement meant little. The accompanying chart will show all

5

Equal Share
£
788.8
£
500.0
£ 1,800.0
£ 1,200.0
£ 250.4

6
7

£
£

8
9

£ 1,000.0

Case
I
2

3
4

IO
II

Share Given
£ 71.4
£
33.3
£ 200.0
£ IO0.0
£
5.0
£
9.0
£
IO.0

10.5
IO.0
50.0
£ 250.0
$6,000.00
$1,000.00
$ 24.56
£
£
£

Percent of
ProRata
9.05
6.66
II.II

8.33
1 ·99 '
3.23
3.99
1.69
1.58
7.90
25.00
49.48
2.67
42.89

$12,125.00
$37,500.00
$
57.21
* Indicates the conclusion is dictum.
I. Dyke v. Sylvester, 12 Ves. Jr. 126 (1806).
2. Mocatta v. Lousada, 12 Ves. Jr. 123 (1806).
3. Butcher v. Butcher, 9 Ves. Jr. 382 (1804).
4. Bax v. Whitebread, IO Ves. Jr. 31 (1804).
5. Spencer v. Spencer, 5 Ves. Jr. 362 (1800).
6. Vanderzee v. Aclom, 4 Ves. Jr. 771 (1797).
7. Kemp v. Kemp, 5 Ves. Jr. 849 (1795).
8. Wilson v. Piggott, 2 Ves. Jr. 351 (1795).
9. McCormick v. Security Trust Co., 184 Ky. 25 (1919).
IO. Barrett's Exr. v. Barrett, 166 Ky. 411 (1915).
11. City of Portsmouth v. Shackford, 46 N.H. 423 (1866).

Holding
Good
Good
Good
Good
Bad
Bad*
Bad*
Bad
Bad
Good*
Good
Good
Bad
Good*

of the instances in which the courts have passed upon the question
whether a given sum is illusory. There are other cases on this point,
but they are incapable of tabulation because all of the facts are not
108

166 Ky. 411 at 414, 179 S.E. 396 (1915).
"As therefore no case has been found, in which a sum of this amount has been
declared illusory, there is no ground, upon which I think myself justified in determining, that this is an invalid appointment." Butcher v. Butcher, 9 Ves. Jr. 382 at
109
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included in the report. An examination of the table will give a fairly
accurate picture of where the dividing line should be drawn. The fact
that there is no overlapping of percentages should prove significant,
because it tends to substantiate the fact that there is· an actual line
dividing substantial sums from mere nominal appointments. The largest appointment which is intimated to be illusory is equal to three and
ninety-nine hundredths per cent of an equal share, and the smallest
sum which is held to be substantial is equal to six and sixty-six hundredths per cent of an equal share. At what precise point between these
two figures the line is to be drawn will remain unknown until future
decisions are encountered which present the question. However, with
the material now at hand, the courts should have little trouble in determining the substantiality of an appointment that falls either above or
below the percentages mentioned.

3. Relationship of the Objects and the Donor
In practically all cases the objects of the power are related to the
donor in the same manner. They are usually children, grandchildren,
brothers and sisters, or members of some other class which have the
same degree of relationship. Therefore, a small appointment cannot be
justified on the ground that this particular object was not as close to the
donor as the either objects. If the objects do have a different degree of
relationship, there is a possibility that the court would have to take this
into account in passing on the substantiality of the appointment. However, no reported cases have been found in which this factor entered
into the consideration of the substantiality of the appointment.

4. Other Factors
There are certain other factors which are of minor importance in
determining whether a given share is substantial. In subdivision II it
was mentioned that while the conduct of the object might warrant an ·
exclusion it was of little importance at the present time. For the same
reasons mentioned therein, behaviour may also. play a small part in
determining substantiality.110
399, 32 Eng. Rep. 650 (1804). See also Mocatta v. Lousada, 12 Ves. Jr. 123, 33
Eng. Rep. 47 (1806)'.
110
Bristow v. Warde, 2 Ves. Jr. 336, 30 Eng. Rep. 660 (1794); Clarke v.
Turner, 2 Fre~m. 198, 22 Eng. Rep. 1158 (1694).
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· In Long 'V. Long 111 the court held that there could be no question
of an illusory appointment if the object was provided for by other
means. This would undoubtedly be governed by the same qualifications
as govern a total exclusion for this reason, because the essential difference between a total exclusion and the giving of an illusory share is
really only a matter of degree.
The intent of the donee may affect the decision of the court. In
Kemp 'V. Kemp 112 the court held an appointment to be void. In the
decision it was said that the sum in question (£rn) was clearly meant
as an illusion and not an execution. However, it has never been suggested that it was necessary to show an intent on the part of the donee
to give an illusory sum before the appointment could be set aside. If
such a factor is necessary it is evidently implied from other facts in the
case.

IV
LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The law relating to nonexclusive appointments has been another
attempt to accomplish judicially a just result. In certain powers each·
object should be given a portion of the property, and the share given
ought to be a substantial amount. This was the result which the early
English courts hoped to attain, but time has proved that they were
unable to attain any degree of success.
Fundamentally the inability of the courts to determine when a sum
was nominal underlies the entire failure of the law. The whole scheme
of this phase of the law depended upon relief in equity when a sum
was illusory, and when the courts were unable to determine this factor
there was little to be accomplished in distinguishing between an exclusive and a nonexclusive power. Because of this the courts soon became
dissatisfied with the doctrine, and, although following it, the courts
admitted they were reluctant to do so. In Vanderzee 'V. Aclom 118 it was
said that the share given to the object must be substantial "though from
the difficulty, that has followed, one cannot but lament the rule."
Because of the difficulties mentioned an act was passed in I830 to
remedy the situation.114 The preamble of the act stated that certain
difficulties and inconveniences had arisen because of the equitable rule
111

5 Ves. Jr. 445, 31 Eng. Rep. 674 (1800).

112

5 Ves. Jr. 849, 31 Eng. Rep. 891 (1795).

118

4 Ves. Jr. 771 at 785, 31 Eng. Rep. 399 (1797).
I Wm. 4, c. 46 (1830).
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that the share given to an object must be substantial.. Hence, it was
expedient that such appointments should be as valid in equity as at
law; it was therefore enacted that fron;i and after that date no appointment should be impeached in equity on the ground that.the sum given
was nominal.
·
By this act it was thought that all difficulties had been ironed out of
the law and the question finally settled. The result in reality placed the
law at the same stage it was when equity first intervened. The reason
for the equitable interference had been the unjustness of allow:ing an
object to be cut off with a shilling. After the passage of the act the
status of an object receded to the position occupied a hundred years
before. The case of In Re Stone 115 illustrates the judicial interpretation
of the act. In that case the donee executed a nonexclusive power of appointment by giving one of the objects a square yard of land.- The court
agreed that this amount was illusory, but sajd that the statute provided
for the giving of a sum that was nominal, and hence the appointment
was valid. This result was as undesirable as the state of the law before
the act of 1830, and again the legislature took a hand in the matter.
In 1874 an act was passed which permanently removed any· doubt
as to the law in relation to nonexclusive appointments. The act recited
that many appointments failed because the donee omitted some of the
objects, and it was desirable that this situation be changed. Hence, no
appointment should be declared invalid on the ground that one or more
of the objects were entirely excluded in the exercise thereof.116 By this
act the legal consequences of a nonexclusive power were completely
abolished, and after the passage of the act there was little practical
value to be obtained in distinguishing between the two types of powers.
The first act had allowed the donee to cut off an object with a shilling
and this act enabled the donee to cut off the shilling also.117 The English law has remained unchanged since the time of the act of 1874.
When the English Property Act was enacted in 192 5 a provision was
adopted which merely restated the law as regards nonexclusive powers
as it stood
at that time.118
,
In the United States there have been several states which have
enacte~ statutes changing the law in regard to nonexclusive powers.
115

3 LR. Eq. 621 (1869).
37-38 Viet., c. 37, § l (1874).
117
FARWELL, PowERs, 3rd ed., 427-428 (1916).
118
English Law of Property Act 1925, § 158 (1), 15 Geo. 5, c. 20.
116
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The first state to attempt to modify the law was New York. Its statute
reads as follows:
"Where a disposition under a power is directed to be made to,
among, or between, two or more persons, without any specification of the share or sum to be allotted to each, all the persons
designated shall be entitled to an equal proportion; but when the
terms of the power import that the estate or fund is to be distributed among the persons so designated, in such manner or proportions as the grantee of the power thinks proper, the grantee
may allot the whole to any one or more of such persons in exclusion of the others." 119
Similar statutes are in operation in the District of Columbia,120
Alabama 121 Michigan 122 Minnesota 123 North Dakota 124 Oklahoma 125
' 126 and 'Wisconsin.121 'However, these statutes
'
'
South Dakota,
substitute
the term trustee for donee or grantee of the power. By this change it
may be said that the statute would only apply when the power was said
to be in trust; but it is more likely that the courts will hold the word
trustee synonymous with donee, and, therefore, apply the statute to
any and all powers of appointment.
It is difficult to determine the effect of the American statutes.
There have been no cases which directly interpret them, and as a result
no conclusive statement regarding them can be made. It would seem
that where there is no discretion on the part of the donee each object
must be given an equal share, but where the donee has a discretion as
to the proportions which are to be given, he may exclude any of the
objects. As a practical matter it would seem that the donee has a discretion in the majority of the cases. Hence, where the law has been
changed by statute the result reached is very similar to that of England.
The author believes that the view originally adopted by the courts
of England is by far the most just. The main objection, as was previously pointed out, was a failure to agree on what constituted an illusory
N.Y. Stat. (McKinney, 1937) "Real Property,"§ 158.
D.C. Code (1940), § 45-1015.
121
Ala. Code (1940), § 47-85.
122
Mich Stat. Ann. (1937), §§ 26.n6, 26.n7.
123
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§ 8132, 8133.
124
N.D. Comp. Laws (1913), §§ 5437, 5438.
125
Okla. Stat. (1941), §§ 60-294, 60-295.
126
S.D. Code (1939), §§ 59.0455, 59.0456.
127
Wis. Stat. (1941), §§ 232.23, 232.26.
119
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sum. This question should have been determined by a comparison between the sum given and the sum which would represent an equal share.
It is true that this would place the law on a mechanical basis and would
tend to restrict the freedom of action which was one of the characteristics of the court of equity. However, it is noticeable that in at least one
other instance the court resorted to such a device in order to remove
the element of uncertainty from its decisions.128
At any rate the English statil.tory change is probably preferable to
the American. It may be true that there is no difference between the
English statute and the American legislative changes, but the English
law seems to be more certain, and it is desirable that the jurisdictions
which enact future legislation adopt the English rather than the New
York form.
128 In allowing an abatement on the purchase price because of a mistake in regard
to the quantity of land sold in gross the Kentucky court adopts a mechanical rule, allowing the abatement where the deficie_ncy is in excess of ten per cent of the total
amount of land sold. Cecil v. Knox, 195 Ky. 214, 242 S.W. 26 (1922); Landrum
v. Wells, (Ky. 1909) 122 S. E. 213.
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